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THE GLOBALISATION OF TAX GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
*By Professor Christiana HJI Panayi 
 
 
(I) INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This is a unique era where the international tax community, most vocally represented by 
developed countries mainly through the OECD/G20 is engaged in a global fight against tax 
evasion/avoidance. It is thought that lack of tax cooperation increases the risk of cross-border 
tax evasion and avoidance. As noted by the OECD, “[c]o-operation between tax 
administrations is critical in the fight against tax evasion and protecting the integrity of tax 
systems.”1 The recalcitrance shown by some countries to engage in deeper cooperation is 
something that is widely criticised. However, apart from the traditional notions of 
cooperation/assistance and exchange of information commonly viewed as instrumental in the 
fight against tax evasion/avoidance, another concept has emerged – that of good tax governance 
or tax good governance or fiscal good governance.2 Countries are increasingly being asked to 
adopt standards of tax good governance either on a stand-alone basis or in the context of the 
fight against aggressive tax planning, without a common understanding of what this concept 
actually entails.3 
 
Notwithstanding the uncertainties surrounding tax good governance, it is acquiring increasing 
importance and institutional backing, both internationally but within the European Union. 
However, there seem to be many facets of tax good governance and it is not always clear what 
the term actually covers. It would seem that from the perspective of international organisations 
such as the OECD and the UN, the focus is on the relationship/cooperation between 
governments and to a lesser extent, between governments and taxpayers. There is also an 
emphasis on developing countries and domestic resource mobilisation. This is still very much 
a soft law approach. The many facets of this concept will be examined in the following sections 
and an attempt will be made to determine whether the soft law qualities of this concept are 
gradually morphing into hard law, especially in the context of the European Union. The paper 
will examine the implications of this approach and the paradox that it creates. 
  
 
(II) GLOBAL TRENDS IN GOOD TAX GOVERNANCE 
 
 
The concept of governance or good governance is not something new or specific to the tax 
world. It has actually been used for some time in the development literature4and has be used in 
many contexts; for example, corporate governance, international governance etc.  
                                                          
1 http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/automaticexchange.htm 
2 The terms are used interchangeably.  
3 Alicja Brodzka & Sebastiano Garufi, “The Era of Exchange of Information and Fiscal Transparency: The Use 
of Soft Law Instruments and the Enhancement of Good Governance in Tax Matters” [2012] 8 European Taxation 
394; Gemma Martinez Barbara, “The Role of Good Governance in the Tax Systems of the European Union”, 
[2011] 5/6 Bulletin for International Taxation 270 
4 See “Good Governance and the World Bank”, edited by Vivien Collingwood, available at: 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpuprojects/drivers_urb_change/urb_economy/pdf_glob_SAP/BWP_Governance_World
%20Bank.pdf ; See “Good Governance: An Overview”, by the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, available at: http://www.ipa.government.bg/sites/default/files/pregled-dobro_upravlenie.pdf . 
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Most quasi-definitions of good governance include the following: increased public 
accountability and transparency; respect for and strengthening of the rule of law and anti-
corruption measures; democratisation, decentralisation and local government reform; increased 
civil-society participation in development; and respect for human rights and the environment. 
As succinctly put by Sheng, good governance has eight important characteristics: “[i]t is 
participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.”5 Broadly, good governance agendas focus 
on reforming the relationship between government, civil society and the market.6 
 
As far as tax practices are concerned, there are several ways in which notions of good 
governance are used. Firstly, development finance institutions are increasingly focusing on 
promoting responsible tax practices in their private sector investments. This is, arguably, an 
extension of the controversial good governance conditionality clause imposed by development 
institutions in the 1980s, whereby conditions to loans were attached in order to exert pressure 
on borrowing countries to improve their policies and enhance the effectiveness of aid. In the 
context of tax governance, development institutions now try to leverage private sector 
investments to promote a responsible tax agenda, mainly by precluding investment in private 
sector businesses which engage in tax evasion and illegal tax activities. For example, the World 
Bank Group prohibits investments in companies controlled through an ‘ineligible intermediary 
jurisdiction’, considered non-compliant with international tax transparency standards. Other 
development institutions have similar policies.7 Obviously, such policies do not prohibit 
investment in companies engaged in aggressive but legal tax planning,8 as such rendering such 
conditionality largely ineffective.   
 
More traditionally, the focus of good tax governance has been on domestic resource 
mobilisation and capacity building by developing countries. In the past decade, through a 
number of reports and initiatives, the OECD and the UN have called for measures to improve 
governance in this area – all of which were in the realm of soft law, as shown below.  
 
 
(A) Domestic Resource Mobilization and Capacity Building: A Substantive But 
Soft Law Approach 
 
 
Recognising the role of taxation as an important catalyst for state capacity development, the 
OECD has long been working on recommendations for institutional and organisational reforms 
needed to improve efficiency and effectiveness. In a report published in 2010,9 the OECD 
                                                          
Also see “The IMF and Good Governance”, available at: www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/The-IMF-and-
Good-Governance; Anton Op de Beke, “IMF Activities to Promote Good Governance and Combat Corruption – 
An Overview”, available at: web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/PDF/OP_DE_BE.PDF  
5 Ibid. 
6 See “Good Governance and the World Bank”, edited by Vivien Collingwood, available at: 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpuprojects/drivers_urb_change/urb_economy/pdf_glob_SAP/BWP_Governance_World
%20Bank.pdf  
7 See Development Finance Institutions and the Responsible Tax Agenda – Fit for Purpose?, published by The 
Tax Dialogue on Corporate Responsibility, available at: http://thetaxdialogue.org/publications/tax-corporate-
responsibility-priority/  
8 See Stephanie Soong Johnston, “World Bank Focusing on Responsible Tax Practices”, Tax Notes International 
152 (Oct 12, 2015) 
9 OECD, Citizen-State Relations: Improving Governance Through Tax Reform (Paris, 2010) 
  
explored how taxation could improve governance. This was to be done firstly, by developing 
a shared interest for economic growth. It was argued that governments which depend on taxes 
have stronger incentives for promoting economic growth.10 As a second measure, there should 
be a development of the state apparatus and tax collection through an improved and functioning 
administration as well as other agencies. Such development may spur improvements in state 
capacity elsewhere. Thirdly, notions of accountability and responsiveness ought to be 
cultivated further,11 by improving equity in tax enforcement and administration, as well as 
improving transparency and strengthening civil society engagement with tax issues.12 As noted, 
taxation engaged taxpayer-citizens in politics; “[g]overnments which rely on taxes have 
incentives to improve governance in order to ensure tax compliance.”13  
 
Recommendations were made to governments to manage the provision of foreign aid in ways 
that maximise positive revenue raising incentives and local accountability.14 In order to 
improve the state’s administrative systems, it was argued that a supportive tax reform agenda 
should focus on strengthening linkages between the tax administration and other areas of 
government. Such linkages may generate direct incentives for improved performance 
elsewhere in government, and create a direct channel for successful innovations to be adopted 
elsewhere.15 A supportive tax reform agenda would also focus on data gathering and 
transparency, as well as local taxation improvements.16 It was argued that data gathered by tax 
administrations could help improve government performance more broadly in areas like 
investment promotion, industrial policy, land management and law enforcement. Also, efforts 
to build a more robust tax administration in local areas, with stronger links to the national tax 
system, may encourage broader improvements in local government performance and expansion 
of effective government in rural areas.  
 
The overtone of the report was that an effective tax system played a key role in state building 
and in developing the economy.17 For that, broader governance improvements were necessary. 
In its report, the OECD concluded that measures to improve tax governance and to support 
more integrated administrative structures were indispensable to any long-term strategy of 
achieving revenue stability and self-sufficiency. In order to improve responsiveness and 
accountability, it was crucial to improve equity in tax enforcement and administration to ensure 
that the legitimacy of tax systems is not undermined.18 It was also identified as important to 
improve public awareness, transparency and taxpayer services and to strengthen civil society 
engagement with tax issues. 
 
Similarly, in developing tax good governance principles, the UN’s focus has been on 
supporting tax policies for developing countries, removing obstacles to cross-border operations 
and fighting tax evasion. Following a UN-led international conference in 2008, the Doha 
                                                          
10 Ibid, p.9 
11 Ibid, pp.9-10 
12 Ibid, pp.10-11 
13 Ibid, p.9 
14 See, Ibid, chapter 4 entitled ‘The role of development partners in building tax-governance linkages’, pp.51-58. 
15 Ibid, p.10, 19-20 
16 See pp.22-23 
17 It was, however, acknowledged in the concluding chapter 5 that further research on the linkage between taxation 
and state-building was necessary. It was also conceded that in the report there was heavy reliance on case studies 
from a relatively small number of countries. Furthermore, very few of the suggestions made had been rigorously 
and specifically tested in practice.  
18 Ibid, pp.29-30 
  
Declaration on Financing for Development was adopted by consensus.19 The Doha Declaration 
recognised the importance of strengthening technical assistance and enhancing international 
cooperation in addressing international tax matters, including in the area of double taxation. 
Commitments were made to enhance tax revenues through modernized tax systems and more 
efficient tax collection. This would help broaden the tax base and effectively combat tax 
evasion. Developed countries confirmed their strong commitment to maintain their Official 
Development Assistance20 targets irrespective of the current financial crisis. The Doha 
Declaration also reaffirmed and built on the earlier Monterrey Consensus21 and called for a UN 
Conference at the highest level to examine the impact of the world financial and economic 
crisis on development. 
 
The Addis Tax Initiative (also called the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, or the Addis Ababa 
Initiative) is the current point of reference on development financing. It was initiated by the 
governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America. The Addis Tax Initiative, together with follow-up initiatives, set out a vision of how 
development financing should evolve and highlighted the importance of domestic resource 
mobilisation. Domestic resource mobilisation was not only essential to ensuring sustainable 
development but it also helped strengthen the relationship between citizens and the state, 
fostering good governance. As discussed above, the focus on mobilising domestic public 
revenue had been a leading action for the Financing for Development agenda since Monterrey. 
The Addis Ababa Initiative called for substantial additional development cooperation in this 
area and highlighted the importance of tackling tax evasion and avoidance. More than 45 
countries, regional and international organisations signed up to the Addis Tax Initiative.22 
Interestingly, apart from Indonesia, the Solomon Islands and the Philippines, it would seem 
that no other Asian country is participating in this initiative.23 
 
One important outcome of the Addis Tax Initiative was the promise on the part of developed 
countries to increase international aid and to support capacity building in developing countries 
in order to reduce tax evasion and abuse. In the spirit of the Addis Tax Initiative, participating 
countries declared their commitment to enhance the mobilisation and effective use of domestic 
                                                          
19 UN, Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome Document of the Follow-up International 
Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, 9 Dec 
2008, para 16, pp.8-9 
20 Official development assistance (ODA) is a term coined by the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD. This committee has the mandate to promote development co-operation and other policies so as to 
contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, poverty reduction, improvement of 
living standards in developing countries, and a future in which no country will depend on aid. Most ODA comes 
from the members of the Development Assistance Committee. The European Commission and non-member 
countries also provide some aid. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm  
21 See Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (2003). Available on: 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf  
22 The following countries have joined the Addis Tax Initiative: Australia, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, European Commission, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, 
Kenya, Korea, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Uganda, United 
Kingdom and the United States of America. Furthermore, the following regional and international organisations, 
fora and private sector foundations have joined the Addis Tax Initiative as supporting organisations: African Tax 
Administration Forum (ATAF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Center of 
Excellence in Finance, Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA), Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrations 
(CIAT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), West African Tax Administration Forum (WATAF) and the World Bank. 
23 See https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/#slider-4 . The Asian Development Bank is a supporting organisation. 
  
revenues and to improve the fairness, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of their tax 
systems. Furthermore, countries restated their commitment to ensure policy coherence for 
development. Very importantly, participating providers of international support promised to 
collectively double their technical cooperation in the area of domestic revenue 
mobilisation/taxation by 2020. In addition to broad-based capacity building, participating 
countries were also expected to take advantage of the progress made on the international tax 
agenda, such as the BEPS project and the increased use of automatic exchange of information. 
An effort would be made to integrate partner countries into the global tax debate and improve 
taxation and management of revenue from natural resources.24 
 
The Addis Tax Initiative was agreed at the third UN International Conference on Financing for 
Development in July 2015. Following this, a United Nations Summit on Sustainable 
Development25 was held in September 2015 which garnered visibility, political support and 
impetus for the truly transformative 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.26  Speakers at 
the Summit welcomed the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 
17 Sustainable Development Goals.27 The 2030 Agenda builds on and integrates the outcome 
of the Addis Tax Initiative.28 It recognizes for the first time illicit financial flows as a detriment 
to sustainable development both in developing and developed countries. They are also seen as 
a sign of poor governance and weak legal and institutional frameworks. 
 
The 2030 Agenda was expected to serve as a springboard for action by the international 
community and by national governments to promote shared prosperity and well-being for all 
over the next 15 years. A call was made to strengthen international institutions, with 
multilateral regional and international organisations contributing more towards sustainable 
development. Furthermore, many developing countries discussed their own primary 
responsibility for mobilizing resources to implement the 2030 Agenda and to integrate it in 
their national development plans, strategies and priorities. Most of the Sustainable 
Development Goals are to be implemented at national and local levels.  
 
 
 
The above developments suggest that good tax governance is closely interlinked with notions 
of domestic resource mobilisation, capacity building, transparency and exchange of 
information, and, to an extent, the implementation of the four minimum standards derived from 
the BEPS project. The international tax community, through its most prolific international 
organisations, has given a lot of emphasis on the above state functions. It is noteworthy that 
the above initiatives, whilst laudable, are very much in the realm of soft law – they are 
                                                          
24 See https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/  
25 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/8521Informal%20Summary%20-
%20UN%20Summit%20on%20Sustainable%20Development%202015.pdf 
26 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was contained in the document entitled “Transforming Our 
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld  
27 P.1. The Sustainable Development Goals consist of 17 goals and 169 associated targets. They are expected to 
frame the agendas and political policies of UN member countries up to 2030. The Sustainable Development Goals 
have replaced the narrower Millennium Development Goals and are considered to be universal targets and 
indicators intended to eradicate poverty in all its forms and dimensions. Therefore, these goals are not just relevant 
to developing countries. See Jeffrey Owens, Alicja Majdańska and Rick McDonell, “Interagency Cooperation, 
Illicit Financial Flows, and Sustainable Development Goals”, 85 Tax Notes Int'l 819 (Feb. 27, 2017) 
28 The 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of a number of issues for all UN Member Countries, including 
poverty elimination, social equality, environment protection, the security-development nexus, good and inclusive 
governance, human rights and gender equality. 
  
recommendations and guidance for good practices. However, it would seem that in addition to 
the soft law initiatives discussed above, there are a growing number of soft law initiatives which 
have hardened over time. Characteristically, these initiatives rely on multilateralism and aim 
to promote global standards which become binding over time. They are examined next. 
 
 
(B)  Global Standards and Multilateralism: The Hardening of Soft Law  
 
 
In this section, the author examines what could be described as norm setting initiatives which 
have emerged and are gaining ground. For the time being, these are mostly of a procedural 
nature and are largely aimed at enhancing transparency and information exchange.  
 
One major development arising from the intense international political interest in fighting tax 
avoidance/evasion is the acceptance and (broad adoption) of the OECD’s global standard for 
automatic exchange of information. In fact, this standard is now becoming a trademark of good 
tax governance for countries. This is not surprising, given that in the last few years, as a result 
of the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of information for Tax 
Purposes,29 having the legal framework to facilitate exchange of information has become a 
benchmark for legitimacy in terms of the OECD’s assessment of cooperative jurisdictions.  
 
International automatic exchange of tax information generally involves the systematic and 
periodic transmission of a large amount of tax-relevant information regarding non-resident 
taxpayers by the tax administration of the source country to the residence country. The tax 
relevant information usually concerns various categories of income (e.g. dividends, interest, 
etc.).30 Tax information, which is exchanged automatically, is normally collected in the source 
state on a routine basis, generally, through reporting by third parties; usually, financial 
institutions, that make or administer payments to non-residents. Automatic exchange of 
information typically serves the residence state in determining the tax liability of its residents 
when that liability depends on the worldwide income or assets of the resident.  
 
Notwithstanding references to automatic or spontaneous exchange of information in Art 26 of 
the OECD Model and other models,31 until relatively recently, exchange of information was to 
an extent mainly on request and rather sporadic. Exchange of information in general as an 
instrument for fighting international tax avoidance and tax havens received a major boost 
following the G20 Communiqué issued at the London 2009 Summit. In this summit, the G20 
leaders agreed to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens, and 
                                                          
29 This Global Forum is hosted by the OECD but is financed by and reports only to its own members. Although 
the OECD merely observes during the Global Forum’s meetings, it has a strong influence over its functions. See 
Torsten Fensby & Per Olav Gjesti, “Global Forum and Nordic Countries Combat Tax Avoidance and Evasion”, 
Tax Nots International, June 12, 2017, pp.999-1000 
30 OECD, Comm. Fiscal Affairs, Automatic Exchange of Information: What It Is, How It Works, Benefits, What 
Remains to Be Done, p. 9 (OECD 2012), available at www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-
exchange-of-information-report.pdf page 8. Also see OECD, Council Recommendation C (81)39. See OECD, 
Recommendation of the Council concerning a Standardized Form for Automatic Exchanges of Information under 
International Tax Agreements (OECD 1981).  
31 See, for example, the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters. In the initial (2002) version 
of the OECD’s Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters (the TIEA Model), the proposed 
exchange of information was upon request only. On 7 August 2015, a protocol was published by the OECD which 
amended the TIEA Model to include automatic exchange of information. See Model Protocol for the Purpose of 
Allowing the Automatic and Spontaneous Exchange of Information under a TIEA. Available on: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Model-Protocol-TIEA.pdf) 
  
if necessary to deploy sanctions to protect their public finances and financial systems.32 
Countries were called to adopt and implement the international tax standards of transparency 
and information exchange – standards which had become top priority by then.  
 
Since 2009, the OECD has been publishing progress reports on the implementation of the 
internationally agreed tax standard33 by jurisdictions surveyed by the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of information for Tax Purposes. In these progress reports, 
jurisdictions were categorised in three lists: the white list,34 the grey list35 and the black list.36 
This list was regularly updated. All jurisdictions covered by the Global Forum have now 
committed to the international agreed tax standards and more than half have implemented them. 
Furthermore, a peer review process has begun through which the Global Forum monitors 
jurisdictions, assesses their legal and regulatory framework, the actual implementation of 
standards and their tax treaties and tax information exchange agreements. Again, countries 
have been categorised in terms of their compliance with these standards.37 In the context of this 
exercise, the Global Forum has published several general progress reports and peer review 
reports. 
 
On 6 September 2013, the G20 Leaders formally committed to automatic exchange of 
information as the new global standard and fully supported the OECD’s work in this area. The 
standard would oblige countries and jurisdictions to obtain all financial information from their 
financial institutions and exchange that information automatically with other jurisdictions on 
an annual basis. The standard drew extensively on the intergovernmental approach to 
implementing the US FATCA, with a view to maximizing efficiency and reducing cost for 
financial institutions. On 23 February 2014, the G20 Finance Ministers endorsed the Common 
Reporting Standard38 for automatic exchange of tax information.39 A few weeks later, there 
was a joint statement of an Early Adopters Group.40 In this joint statement, more than 40 
countries committed to early adoption of the Common Reporting Standard.41  
                                                          
32 G20 London Summit – Leaders’ Statement – 2 April 2009, para 15  
Available on: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf  
33 This is set out in footnote 1 of the Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum 
in Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard, on the progress made as at 2 April 2009. “The 
internationally agreed tax standard, […] requires exchange of information on request in all tax matters for the 
administration and enforcement of domestic tax law without regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank 
secrecy for tax purposes. It also provides for extensive safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the information 
exchanged.”  
34 This list included countries that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard. 
35 This list included countries committed to the internationally agreed tax standard but that have not yet 
substantially implemented it. 
36 This list included countries that have not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard. 
37 As regards the Global Forums review process, and the results, see 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/brief-and-FAQ-on-progress-on-tax-transparency.pdf  
38 In this paper, the terms standard, CRS and common reporting standard are used interchangeably. 
39 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: Common Reporting Standard  
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-financial-account-information-
common-reporting-standard.pdf (CRS Report) 
40 Joint Statement of Early Adopters Group available on: http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-early-
adopters-statement.pdf 
41 The early adopters were the following: Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, the Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South  Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom; the UK's Crown Dependencies of Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey; and the UK's Overseas 
Territories of Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, and the 
Turks & Caicos Islands.  
  
 
On 21 July 2014, the OECD released the full version of the Standard for Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters.42 The full version of the Standard includes 
commentaries and guidance for implementation by governments and financial institutions, 
detailed model agreements, as well as standards for harmonised technical and information 
technology modalities, notably a standard format and requirements for secure transmission of 
data.43 A country adopting the Standard must be or become a party to the Council of 
Europe/OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters which creates the 
legal framework for automatic exchange of information. It must also sign a Multilateral 
Competent Authority Agreement containing provisions of the Standard, to operationalise the 
automatic exchange of information. 
 
Another emerging standard of good tax governance which came directly out of the BEPS 
project is country-by-country reporting. Country-by-country reporting was something that 
NGOs and civil society have long called for.44 The launch of the BEPS project helped put the 
discussion on country-by-country reporting at the forefront. Country-by-country reporting was 
finally perceived as an indispensable element of transfer pricing documentation. It was 
recognised that enhancing transparency for tax administrations by providing them with 
adequate information to assess high-level transfer pricing across national borders was crucial 
to the success of the BEPS project.45 A three-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation 
consisting of a master file, a local file and a Country-by-Country report, taken together, was 
expected to make taxpayers articulate consistent transfer pricing positions and provide tax 
administrations with useful information “to assess transfer pricing risks, make determinations 
about where audit resources can most effectively be deployed, and, in the event audits are called 
for, provide information to commence and target audit enquiries”.46 This information was also 
expected to make it easier for tax administrations to identify whether companies have engaged 
in practices that have the effect of artificially shifting income into tax-advantaged 
environments.  
 
This three-tiered standardised approach to transfer pricing documentation was developed in the 
three discussion documents released in the context of Action 1347 and encapsulated in the Final 
                                                          
42 See Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information Report, available on: 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-
financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page1  
43 See also documents published in August 2015: an implementation handbook 
(http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/implementation-handbook-standard-for-automatic-
exchange-of-financial-information-in-tax-matters.pdf), a Model Protocol to the Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Model-Protocol-TIEA.pdf), and an updated 
report on offshore voluntary disclosure programs (OECD, Update on Voluntary Disclosure Programmes – A 
Pathway to Tax Compliance, available on: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Voluntary-
Disclosure-Programmes-2015.pdf) 
44 See, for example, http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/country-by-country/ . Also see the OECD 
White Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation (30 July 2013), available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/white-paper-transfer-pricing-documentation.pdf  
45 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/country-by-country-reporting.htm Also see Andrew Hickman, Samia 
Abdelghani, Paul Hondius, “Action 13: Transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting”, 
International Tax Review. 1/4/2016, p1 
46 Final Report on Action 13, Executive summary, p.9 
47 Action 13 of the BEPS project reads as follows: “Develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to 
enhance transparency for tax administration, taking into account the compliance costs for business. The rules to 
be developed [would] include a requirement that MNEs provide all relevant governments with needed information 
on their global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries according to a common 
template.” 
  
Report.48 It led to the new Chapter V of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Pursuant to 
the three tiered approach, MNEs are required to provide tax administrations with high-level 
information regarding their global business operations and transfer pricing policies in a master 
file that is available to all relevant tax administrations. MNEs are also required to provide in a 
local file specific to each country, detailed transactional transfer pricing, identifying material 
related party transactions, the amounts involved in those transactions, and the company’s 
analysis of the transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions. 
In addition, MNEs are required to file a Country-by-Country report that would provide 
annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of revenue, profit 
before income tax and income tax paid and accrued.49 The Country-by-Country report is to be 
used as a high-level risk assessment tool and not as the basis to propose transfer pricing 
adjustments using a global formulary apportionment of income.50  
 
MNEs have to file the master file and the local file directly to local tax administrations. 
Country-by-Country reports are filed in the jurisdiction of tax residence of the ultimate parent 
entity and are shared between jurisdictions through automatic exchange of information. This is 
to be done through the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, bilateral tax treaties and/or tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In limited 
circumstances, secondary mechanisms, including local filing can be used as a backup. There is 
no public country-by-country reporting51 for the time being and tax administrations must take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the information is not released to the public.52 
 
                                                          
48 OECD (2015),Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241480-en  
49 Under this country-by-country report, MNEs must report their number of employees, stated capital, retained 
earnings and tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction. They must also identify each entity within the group doing 
business in a particular tax jurisdiction and provide an indication of the business activities each entity engages in. 
50 Ibid, para 25 of new Chapter V of OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. For a discussion of the concerns that the 
information provided under country-by-country reporting might lead to formulary apportionment see Maria 
Amparo Grau Ruiz, “Country-by-Country Reporting: The Primary Concerns Raised by a Dynamic Approach”, 
68 [2014] 10 Bulletin for International Taxation 557-566 
51 In the initial discussion draft (see OECD, Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC 
Reporting (30 January 2014), available on: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-transfer-
pricing-documentation.pdf), it was uncertain and open for discussion how the master file and country-by-country 
report, once prepared, would be shared among participating country tax authorities. Concerns had already been 
noted about the confidentiality of the data.  
The Country-by-Country Revised Discussion Draft stipulated that tax administrations should take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that there was no public disclosure of confidential information and other commercially sensitive 
information contained in the documentation package. Tax administrations should also assure taxpayers that the 
information presented in transfer pricing documentation would remain confidential. This stipulation was in rather 
vague terms and did not meet the concerns of stakeholders for more certainty. The Country-by-Country Revised 
Discussion Draft referred to the OECD Guide ‘Keeping It Safe’ on the protection of confidentiality. (The OECD 
Guide ‘Keeping It Safe’ is available on: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/keeping-it-safe-
report.pdf) This report contained useful guidelines which were more suitable to bilateral scenarios and not 
necessarily tailored to the multi-jurisdictional reporting setting envisaged in the Country-by-Country Revised 
Discussion Draft. See Christiana HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues in International and European Tax Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2015), chapter 4 (henceforth, HJI Panayi (2015)). 
52 See paras 18-21 of new Chapter V of OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, set out in the Country-by-Country 
Revised Discussion Draft. The formal citation of this discussion draft is: OECD, Guidance on Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (2014), available on: http://www.oecd.org/tax/guidance-on-
transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-9789264219236-en.htm) 
  
In order to facilitate the implementation of this standard, an implementation package was 
developed.53 Furthermore, influenced by the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Tax Matters and the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information, the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the 
Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports was developed to set forth rules and procedures as 
may be necessary for competent authorities to automatically exchange Country-by-Country 
reports. In March 2016, the OECD released its standardised electronic format for the exchange 
of Country-by-Country reports between jurisdictions and a user guide for tax administrations 
and taxpayers.54 
 
These new reporting standards are effective for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 
2016 and apply, subject to the 2020 review, to MNEs with an annual consolidated group 
revenue equal to or exceeding EUR 750 million. The first automatic exchanges of Country-by-
Country reports will take place no later than June 2018. All members of the OECD’s Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS55 have committed to implement this minimum standard on Country-by-
Country reporting, and to participate in the peer review over the implementation of the 
standard.  
 
In May 2017, the OECD released information on the Country-by-Country reporting 
implementation status and exchange relationships between tax administrations.56 It was 
reported that up to that time, more than 700 automatic exchange relationships had been 
established among jurisdictions committed to exchanging Country-by-Country reports as of 
2018. Some jurisdictions also continued to work towards agreeing bilateral competent authority 
agreements for the automatic exchange of Country-by-Country Reports with specific partners 
under tax treaties or Tax Information Exchange Agreements.  
 
Arguably, country-by-country reporting reinforces the dialogue between governments/tax 
authorities and businesses in more developed jurisdictions and launches such dialogue in less 
developed jurisdictions. The correct implementation of country-by-country reporting, for 
which many instruments have been developed by the OECD, not only ensures a level playing 
field, but it also provides certainty for taxpayers and improves the ability of tax administrations 
to use these reports in their risk assessment work.  
 
Overall, notwithstanding the business sector’s concerns on the compliance burden that would 
fall on MNEs as a result of these proposals, country-by-country reporting has become a reality 
– arguably, one of the flagship outcomes of the BEPS project. Several countries have already 
started implementing all three elements of Action 13. Furthermore, as discussed below,57 
following a proposal by the European Commission, the Mutual Assistance Directive on 
                                                          
53 This implementation package consisted of model legislation which could be used by countries to require the 
ultimate parent entity of an MNE group to file the Country-by-Country report in its jurisdiction of residence and 
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reports among tax administrations. 
54 See Country-by-Country Reporting XML Schema: User Guide for Tax Administrations and Taxpayers, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/country-by-country-reporting-xml-
schema-user-guide-for-tax-administrations-and-taxpayers.htm  
55 The OECD has set up the BEPS Inclusive Framework in 2016 to monitor the implementation of the BEPS 
minimum standards. The BEPS minimum standards are the recommendations under Actions 5, 6, 13 and 14. 
OECD countries and non-OECD countries participate in the Inclusive Framework. 
56 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-action-13-oecd-releases-cbc-reporting-implementation-status-and-
exchange-relationships-between-tax-administrations.htm  
57 See Part IV.A. 
  
Administrative Assistance (2011/16/EU) has been amended to comply with Action 13, by 
requiring automatic exchange of country-by-country reports. In fact, following the Panama 
leaks, the European Commission has made another proposal to require public country-by-
country reporting for large MNEs. The issue is revisited in the next section. 
 
The connecting link of all these emerging standards seems to be transparency – a basic tenet 
of good tax governance. It would seem that soft law measures linked to transparency (mostly 
dealing with exchange of information) are morphing into hard law gradually. In other words, 
measures proposed to enforce and/or monitor transparency are gradually becoming global 
standards and global norms. This is certainly the case in the context of the EU, as discussed in 
the next part of this paper. 
 
 
(III) GOOD TAX GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
(A) The early developments 
 
 
It is very important to examine the development of the concept of tax good governance in the 
EU, as this has very important implications not just within the EU but also vis-a-vis third 
countries. Overall, the EU is seeking to lead by example in the area of tax good governance, 
both by applying high internal standards and promoting similar measures abroad. In fact, the 
EU should perhaps be accredited with coining the concept of good tax governance or good 
governance in tax matters, and setting out its own criteria.58 Up until the EU’s initiatives, the 
application of principles of good governance in a fiscal setting focused heavily on domestic 
resource mobilisation and capacity building vis-à-vis developing countries, as shown in Part 
II.A. The EU’s approach, early on, appeared to be more comprehensive and inclusive, 
purporting to address issues both in the context of developed and developing countries. It could 
be argued that the EU’s support and the emphasis placed on good tax governance gave more 
credence to the concept and, to an extent, transformed it. In addition, it was obvious that from 
the start, good tax governance in the EU was to be inextricably linked with the reduction of 
‘unfair’ tax competition – whatever that term entailed. This explains the importance given to 
the EU’s Code of Conduct on Business Taxation and the demands for its application not only 
by the Member States but also third countries, as shown in subsequent developments.59  
 
At an ECOFIN meeting in 2008, one of the conclusions of the Council was to promote the 
principles of good governance in the tax area. These principles were described as ‘the principles 
of transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition, as subscribed to by Member 
States at Community level’.60 Good governance in the tax area was identified as an essential 
means of combating cross-border tax fraud and evasion and strengthening the fight against 
money laundering, corruption, and the financing of terrorism. This task, already buttressed by 
other initiatives, 61 was to be taken on by the Commission.  
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In 2009, the Commission produced a Communication for the promotion of good governance 
in tax matters.62 In this Communication, measures were suggested to strengthen the principle 
of good governance in the tax area within the EU and internationally. Several existing internal 
initiatives were identified, as well as proposals to improve the Mutual Assistance Directive and 
the (now obsolete) Savings Directive. The Commission urged the Council to give the issue of 
good governance in the tax area appropriate political priority and to include provisions to that 
effect in general agreements with third countries.63 In a rather innocuous way at the time, 
Member States were encouraged to establish a more unified approach towards third countries, 
regardless of whether those countries apply the principles of good governance in the tax area.64 
Finally, the Commission reiterated its intention to pursue a constructive dialogue with all 
stakeholders concerned.65 
 
Following this Communication, the European Parliament adopted a resolution promoting good 
governance in the area of taxation. The European Parliament condemned the role played by tax 
havens in encouraging and profiting from tax avoidance, tax evasion and capital flight and 
urged the Member States to make the fight against tax havens, tax evasion and illicit capital 
flight a priority.66 The resolution also noted the need for an EU policy of good tax governance.67 
It was obvious that a uniform policy on this matter would be easier to apply and enforce against 
third countries, than the policies of each Member State separately.  
 
Indeed, at a subsequent ECOFIN Council meeting, the Commission was given a mandate to 
initiate dialogue with Switzerland and Liechtenstein, to extend the Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation beyond the Union for the first time.68 This would facilitate the promotion of 
the adoption of the principles of the Code of Conduct in third countries.69 
 
Shortly thereafter, in its 2010 Communication entitled “Tax and Development – Cooperating 
with developing countries on promoting good governance on tax matters”,70 the Commission 
set out domestic resource mobilisation as the policy basis for EU assistance to developing 
countries in building efficient, fair and sustainable tax systems. The Communication focused 
on the synergies between tax and development policies.71 Similar to the OECD report published 
in the same year,72 it was acknowledged that taxation was instrumental for state-building and 
fostering citizenship and that better tax governance in developing countries would increase the 
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62 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 28 April 2009. See Timothy Lyons, 
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64 Ibid, p 13 
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(2009/2174(INI)), para 1 
67 Ibid, para 17 
68 3020th Council meeting Economic and Financial Affairs, Luxembourg, 8 June 2010, PRESSE 162, 10689/10 
69 Ibid, p. 20 
70 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Tax and Development Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good 
Governance in Tax Matters, COM/2010/0163 final 
71 Ibid, p.2 
72 See Part II.A 
  
willingness of EU taxpayers to support development aid. Therefore, it was important to 
strengthen good governance in tax matters in developing countries. The report discussed the 
difficulties encountered by developing countries due to domestic or international factors. It was 
recommended that a better use of dialogue and assessment tools (e.g. governance criteria, 
profiles, action plans) should be made in the appropriate framework for ensuring an effective 
monitoring of domestic revenue issues and good governance commitments in the tax area. This 
would help improve domestic revenue mobilization and strengthen tax administrations. 
 
 
(B) The 2012 Recommendation on Good Tax Governance 
 
 
In 2012, in furtherance to the Commission’s Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax 
fraud and evasion,73 the Commission published two recommendations. One dealt with 
aggressive tax planning74 - henceforth, the Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning.  The 
other Communication dealt with good governance and measures to encourage third countries 
to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters75  - henceforth, the 
Recommendation on Good Tax Governance. To the Commission, these were two sides of the 
same coin. Member States should tackle aggressive tax planning but at the same time, they 
should also ensure that they, as well as any third countries they interact with, apply principles 
of good governance. By linking the EU’s principles of good tax governance with the fight 
against aggressive tax planning, the Commission (further) legitimized its stance, facilitating 
the export of the EU standards in a more coercive way, as shown later on. 
 
In the Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning, it was emphasised that in order for the 
internal market to function better, it was necessary to encourage all Member States to take the 
same general approach towards aggressive tax planning. Member States were, inter alia, urged 
to introduce a subject-to-tax requirement both in their unilateral double tax relief rules and in 
their bilateral tax treaties with other EU Member States and with third countries. Also, Member 
States were encouraged to incorporate general anti-abuse rules in their national legislation.76 
The Commission emphasised the importance of an EU wide response to the problem of 
aggressive tax planning. If countries sought to tackle the problem alone and close loopholes, 
multinationals would simply relocate. The Commission undertook to monitor the 
implementation of these recommendations and to put pressure on countries whose progress 
was slow. 
 
In the Recommendation on Good Tax Governance, the Commission sought to provide Member 
States a set of criteria to identify third countries that did not meet what it called ‘minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters’. According to the Commission, a third country 
only complied with minimum standards of good governance in tax matters where it had adopted 
legal, regulatory and administrative measures intended to comply with the standards of 
transparency and exchange of information,77 where it effectively applied those measures and 
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strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, COM/2012/0722 final 
74 Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning (C (2012) 8806 final) 
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did not operate harmful tax measures in the area of business taxation.78 Tax measures which 
provided for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, were to 
be regarded as potentially harmful.79 In other words, the minimum standards of good 
governance in tax matters encompassed transparency, exchange of information and fair tax 
competition. 
 
The Commission proposed a number of measures to be taken vis-à-vis third countries, with a 
view to encouraging those countries to comply with these standards. It was recommended that 
Member States should publish blacklists of third countries not complying with the minimum 
standards set out above.80 Furthermore, Member States that had already adopted national 
blacklists should include in such lists third countries not complying with these minimum 
standards. Member States were encouraged to renegotiate, suspend or terminate tax treaties 
with non-compliant third countries, as well as initiate bilateral negotiations for tax treaties with 
compliant third countries. Member States were asked to consider offering closer cooperation 
and assistance to third countries, especially developing ones, which were committed to 
complying with the minimum standards. Such closer cooperation would assist those third 
countries in their fight against tax evasion and aggressive tax planning.81 
 
This Recommendation, together with the one on Aggressive Tax Planning and the 
Commission’s Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and evasion showed the 
beginning of a new era. From thereon it became obvious that the main focus of the Commission 
- and to an extent, the other EU institutions - was not only the elimination of tax obstacles to 
cross-border movement but also the protection of national tax bases and the prevention of tax 
avoidance. Furthermore, this Recommendation, although at the time seen as soft law, set the 
wheels in motion for the development of a uniform external fiscal policy. 
 
 
(C) The External Strategy Communication - The Consolidation of 
Common EU Tax Good Governance Criteria  
 
 
For some time, there were calls for the EU to develop a common approach to address external 
challenges to its Member States’ tax bases. As discussed above, the 2012 Recommendation on 
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Good Tax Governance sowed the seeds for a more concrete – hard law - approach. The 
international momentum gained as a result of the BEPS project certainly helped and was fully 
exploited by the European Commission.82 
 
The first steps towards developing a uniform approach to good tax governance was taken with 
the Commission’s Action Plan for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in June 2015.83 
This Action Plan was intended to improve the corporate tax environment in the EU, making it 
fairer, more efficient and more growth-friendly. The key actions included a strategy to re-
launch the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and a framework for effective 
taxation where profits were generated. Very importantly, in the context of this Action Plan, the 
Commission published a first pan-EU list of third-country non-cooperative tax jurisdictions – 
about 30 non-EU tax jurisdictions in the first version of the list.84 The list was to be updated 
periodically and used to develop a common EU strategy to deal with non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions, including via coordinated counter measures.85  
 
The ‘pan-EU list’ prompted a new discussion between these jurisdictions and the relevant 
Member States on tax good governance matters, allowing third countries to clarify issues 
related to their tax regimes and Member States to detail their concerns. This increased 
transparency also encouraged those Member States with listing processes to scrutinize their 
lists and ensure that they were well-founded, accurate and up-to-date. The significant 
divergences in the national listing processes were highlighted through the pan-EU list, along 
with the problems this can cause for the Single Market, third countries and businesses.86 The 
pan-EU list was only intended as an interim solution. The ultimate goal was to create a common 
EU system for assessing, screening and listing third countries. The list was revised several 
times, with the latest revision being in December 2016.87 
 
Given the global nature of harmful tax competition and aggressive tax planning, the need for 
an appropriate combination of efforts at national, EU and global level had been raised at an 
ECOFIN meeting in 2013.88 The Commission’s Communication on a European Union external 
strategy for effective taxation89  (henceforth, the External Strategy Communication) sought to 
address this issue. This Communication was produced in the context of the Commission’s Anti-
Tax Avoidance Package, announced in January 2016,90 as part of its ambitious agenda for 
fairer, simpler and more effective corporate taxation in the EU. 
 
As regards external strategy, it was argued that the diversity in Member States’ approaches sent 
mixed messages to international partners about the EU’s tax good governance expectations. A 
coordinated EU external strategy on tax good governance was therefore “essential to boost 
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Member States’ collective success in tackling tax avoidance, ensure effective taxation and 
create a clear and stable environment for businesses in the Single Market”.91 The External 
Strategy Communication proposed a framework for a new EU external strategy for effective 
taxation, based on a revised tax good governance clause. The Commission identified the key 
measures which could help the EU to promote tax good governance globally but also allow it 
to better integrate tax good governance “into the EU’s wider external relation policies and 
support its international commitments, particularly in the area of development”.92  
 
In this Communication, the EU standards for tax good governance first set out in the 2012 
Recommendation on Good Governance - namely, transparency, exchange of information, and 
fair tax competition - were re-examined in light of fundamental changes in the global tax 
environment and the need for more coherence in Member States’ assessments of third 
countries. The post-BEPS EU standards for tax good governance, described in more detail in 
Annex 1 of this External Strategy Communication, were updated to underlie all EU external 
policies on tax matters and provide a clearer basis for discussing and promoting tax good 
governance with international partners.  
As regards transparency, the revised EU standards were to follow the two internationally 
agreed standards on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes that had been 
developed by the OECD: exchange of information on request and automatic exchange of 
information. At the EU level, the assessment of third countries’ compliance with this standard 
would be influenced by the compliance ratings published by the OECD’s Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes from its peer reviews.93 
As regards fair competition, this was defined as meaning that a third country should not operate 
harmful tax measures in the area of business taxation. Following the guidelines set out in the 
1998 Code of Conduct on Business Taxation and reiterated in the Recommendation on Good 
Governance, it is stated that “[t]ax measures which provide for a significantly lower effective 
level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the third 
country in question are to be regarded as potentially harmful. Such a significantly lower level 
of taxation may operate by virtue of the nominal tax rate, the tax base or any other relevant 
factor.”94 It was expressly stated that when assessing whether such measures are harmful, 
account should be taken of the criteria as provided for in the Code of Conduct on Business 
Taxation and the practice/guidance agreed by the Code of Council working group. 
 
The G20/OECD BEPS standards were also relevant, especially where the G20/OECD BEPS 
Action Plan had resulted in the adoption of minimum standards or a common approach. BEPS 
action items 2, 4-10 and 13-14 were specifically mentioned as relevant standards to be 
followed. It was also added that in assessing standards of fair tax competition, account should 
be taken of the outcome of the framework put in place by the OECD/G20 to monitor the 
implementation of BEPS by OECD/G20.95 Relevant good governance standards for tax 
purposes also included Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. 
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The revised standards also featured in Annex 2, which set out the core elements for a renewed 
good governance clause in negotiating proposals with third countries. In the External Strategy 
Communication, the Commission had considered ways to enhance tax good governance 
cooperation through agreements with third countries. It was recommended that the EU should 
use every tool at its disposal to promote tax good governance internationally. Bilateral and 
regional agreements with third countries were recommended as “particularly useful legal 
instruments [which] offer an opportunity to frame, in a consensual agreement, each side’s 
commitment to adhere to international standards of transparency, information exchange and 
fair tax competition”.96 Such agreements would also allow the EU to ensure that its tax policy 
priorities vis-à-vis third countries are appropriately integrated into its wider external relations. 
It had already been confirmed that trade agreements would support the promotion of the 
international standards of transparency and good governance.97 In fact, tax good governance 
clauses were already included in some trade agreements between the EU and third countries or 
regions though this was not always straightforward. It was admitted that so far, there was mixed 
success with such clauses– they were sometimes resisted, or caused delays to negotiations. 
Whilst it was acknowledged that due to the diversity of the EU’s international partners a one-
size-fits-all approach was not practical, an element of uniformity as regards tax good 
governance clauses was essential.  
 
In the External Strategy Communication, the Commission emphasised how critical it was for 
developing countries to apply tax good governance standards. These efforts were aligned with 
the Addis Tax Initiative,98 the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development99 and the EU’s wider 
development commitments.100 It was affirmed that the Commission was working closely with 
the Member States to ensure an ambitious global outcome.101 The EU and its Member States 
had already undertaken a series of important commitments to support the Addis Tax Initiative 
and the 2030 Agenda.102 Reference was made to the “Collect More-Spend Better” strategy set 
out in a separate report,103 which focused on developing countries. The Collect More-Spend 
Better report explained how the EU intends to assist developing countries improve domestic 
resource mobilisation and having more effective and efficient public expenditure and debt 
management. It was argued that the inclusion of developing countries in the global good 
governance network would prevent weaknesses in the international tax structure that may 
create opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting.104 The ultimate aim was to help 
developing countries participate in relevant international discussions and standard setting 
processes. 
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In the External Strategy Communication, the Commission also announced its intention to 
develop a screening process to assess and list third countries on the basis of their adherence, or 
lack of, to basic indicators of tax good governance. Developing an EU listing process was 
thought to be crucial to the development of the common EU approach on tax good governance. 
It was thought that a single EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions would carry more weight 
than the patchwork of national lists that currently exists and would facilitate in dealing with 
third countries that do not comply with international tax good governance standards. 
Furthermore, a common EU list would also prevent aggressive tax planning by using 
mismatches between the different national systems.105 It would also give international partners 
greater clarity on the EU's expectations in this field.106  
 
Lastly, the Commission recommended that the link between EU funds and tax good governance 
be reinforced.107 The EU Financial Regulation (Art. 140 (4)) prohibits EU funds from being 
invested in or channelled through entities in third countries which do not comply with 
international tax transparency standards. EU and international financial institutions (IFIs) must 
also transpose these good governance requirements in their contracts with all selected financial 
intermediaries. The Commission argued that these provisions could be extended further than 
the current transparency requirements, to also encompass the EU’s principles for fair tax 
competition. The European Parliament has also asked for measures to ensure that EU funding 
cannot be routed through low/no tax jurisdictions. The Commission would, therefore, propose 
to integrate the EU’s updated tax good governance standards into the Financial Regulation.  
 
It would seem that this Commission Communication closely follows some of the work and 
actions undertaken by the European Parliament in this area. The European Parliament has 
addressed tax good governance issues in a number of its resolutions, in particular in the 
resolution prepared by the Special Committee on tax rulings (TAXE 1), adopted in plenary on 
25 November 2015.108 Here, the negative spillover effect of tax avoidance and tax evasion was 
stressed.109 It was emphasised that ensuring fair competition in the internal market and 
protecting Member States’ tax bases depended very much on addressing the weakest link 
regarding interactions with low or no-tax and secrecy jurisdictions.110 Good tax governance 
criteria were crucial to this objective. The role of the EU in promoting the concept of good tax 
                                                          
105 IBFD White Paper, “European Union: Blacklists as a tool to fight tax avoidance”, (authored by Aleksandar 
Bal), dated 25 September 2016 
106 External Strategy Communication, p.9 
107 External Strategy Communication, pp.12-13 
108 See European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature 
or effect (2015/2066(INI)) (available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0408+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#BKMD-8) and more specifically, 
para 152, where it is stated:  
“Considers that the setting up of free trade agreements needs to be accompanied by enhanced tax cooperation, 
preventing tax avoidance by firms competing on the same markets and ensuring a level playing field; asks the 
Commission, therefore, to introduce tax provisions in all EU free trade agreements which would bind partner 
countries to apply good tax governance and ensure reciprocity in tax matters; stresses that the work undertaken 
by the Platform for Tax Good Governance forms a good basis on which to implement this concept; underlines the 
fact that the same could apply to EU cooperation agreements;”. Also see European Parliament, Special Committee 
on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect, Report on tax rulings and other measures similar 
in nature or effect. 
109 Ibid, para M 
110 Ibid, para 80 
  
governance to third countries was further considered in another study commissioned by the 
European Parliament.111  
 
Similar issues were addressed in a report on bringing transparency, coordination and 
convergence to corporate tax policies in the EU, adopted in plenary on 2 December 2015.112 
The report set out numerous legislative recommendations to address aggressive corporate tax 
practices, focusing on transparency, coordination and convergence. The Committee’s 
recommendations included, in particular, country-by-country reporting based on BEPS, but 
also taking into account Parliament’s position on public reporting, effective protection of 
whistle-blowers, a 'fair tax payer' label linked with corporate social responsibility, a common 
European definition of tax havens and setting principles for tax amnesties and tax forgiveness 
schemes, automatic exchange of tax rulings, the introduction of a common European tax 
identification number the CCCTB etc. Many of these recommendations became legislative 
proposals in the next 12 months. 
 
In a related study dealing with the macro-economics of the issues,113 the inefficiencies arising 
from some aggressive tax strategies both for businesses and governments were examined in 
more detail.  It was concluded that the implementation of the CCCTB would help to overcome 
the problem of aggressive tax planning leading to corporate tax avoidance. A common and 
cost-effective Union-wide regulatory framework was the most sensible and effective way of 
limiting and eroding these practices.114 
 
Undeniably, both the Commission and the European Parliament are on the same wave length 
in this area, recognising the importance of applying standards of good tax governance both 
internally and vis-à-vis third countries. At the same time, this is obviously a great opportunity 
for the Commission to push forward its agenda on developing a uniform external fiscal policy 
which would incidentally also support the fight aggressive tax planning. This political setting 
helps to explain the gradual transformation of what are effectively soft law initiatives into 
quasi-hard law, or hard law – to an extent, the Europeanisation of good tax governance 
standards. 
  
 
(IV) Follow-up to the External Strategy Communication: The Europeanisation 
of good tax governance standards 
 
 
(A)  Automatic Exchange of Information and Country-by-Country Reporting 
 
 
                                                          
111 The study was authored by Jeffery Owens. See European Parliament, Promoting Good Tax-Governance in 
Third-Countries: The Role of The EU. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/569976/IPOL_IDA(2015)569976_EN.pdf  
112 See European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on bringing transparency, 
coordination and convergence to Corporate Tax policies in the Union (2015/2010(INL)), dated 2 December 2015. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015-
0349+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  
113 European Parliamentary Research Study, “Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate 
tax policies in the European Union: I-Assessment of the magnitude of aggressive corporate tax planning”. 
Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/558773/EPRS_STU(2015)558773_EN.pdf 
114 Ibid, p.36 
  
As far as exchange of information is concerned, the EU has been at the forefront of 
developments, with the Commission fast-tracking important amendments to existing 
legislation (i.e. the Mutual Assistance Directive on Administrative Cooperation 2011/16/EU). 
For example, in 2014, at the ECOFIN meeting in October 2014, Member States agreed on a 
Commission proposal to apply the widest possible scope of automatic exchange of information 
within the EU, to mirror the global standard of automatic information exchange agreed by the 
G20.115 It was agreed that from 2017, Member State tax authorities would automatically 
exchange information with each other on most categories of income and capital held by private 
individuals and certain entities.116 The revised Mutual Assistance Directive would cover a wide 
scope of income and capital.  
 
This Directive was amended again following a legislative proposal for the automatic exchange 
of information on tax rulings.117 This proposal was in the context of the Tax Transparency 
Package, produced by the Commission in February/March 2015,118 under the auspices of the 
new Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, who was poised to demonstrate to the world 
that he was tough on tax avoidance. The Commission proposed new provisions on exchange 
of tax rulings that were to be built into the existing legislative framework for information 
exchange. Under the proposal, the Member States would be required automatically to exchange 
information with regard to their tax rulings. Every three months, national tax authorities would 
have to send a short report to all other Member States on all cross-border tax rulings and 
advance pricing agreements (APAs) that they have issued after the date of entry into force of 
the proposed Directive, including those that were issued during the last 10 years, but remained 
valid on 1 January 2016. The Member States could then ask for more detailed information on 
a particular ruling. This would enable the rapid implementation of automatic exchange of 
information on tax rulings, as the procedures and processes to do so were already in place. On 
6 October 2015, the Commission announced that the Member States had reached an agreement 
on the automatic exchange of tax rulings,119 with some amendments to the initial proposal. 
 
In the context of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, the Commission again proposed to amend 
the Mutual Assistance Directive on Administrative Cooperation (2011/16) to ensure adoption 
of Action 13 of the OECD/G20 BEPS project on Country-by-Country reporting.120 The 
proposed amendment was approved at the ECOFIN meeting of 25 May 2016, without 
                                                          
115 See Part II.C. 
116 Austria was to be given an additional year to apply the new rules, so as to have sufficient time to make the 
necessary technical adaptations. 
117 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange 
of information in the field of taxation, SWD(2015) 60 final, COM(2015) 135 final, 2015/0068 (CNS) (18 Mar. 
2015), EU Law IBFD.  
118 The Tax Transparency Package was based on the Commission’s commitment in its Work Programme in 
December 2014 to counter tax evasion and tax avoidance and to ensure that taxes were paid in the country where 
profits are generated (see European Commission Press Release IP/14/2703, A New Start: European Commission 
Work Plan to Deliver Jobs, Growth and Investment (16 Dec. 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-14-2703_en.htm). Among the 23 initiatives, see the initiative, entitled “A Fairer Approach to 
Taxation”, which sated the following: “An Action Plan on efforts to combat tax evasion and tax fraud, including 
measures at EU level in order to move to a system on the basis of which the country where profits are generated 
is also the country of taxation; including automatic exchange of information on tax rulings and stabilising 
corporate tax bases”. 
119 European Commission Press Release IP/15/5780, Tax Transparency: Commission Welcomes Agreement 
Reached by Member States on the Automatic Exchange of Information on Tax Rulings (6 Oct. 2015), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5780_en.htm. 
120 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation (COM/2016/025 final (CNS)). 
  
discussion.121  Therefore, even though the OECD/G20 recommendations under Action 13 
BEPS are a minimum standard (which means that OECD and non-OECD countries are strongly 
encouraged to adopt it but not legally bound to do so), EU Member States are under an 
additional legal obligation to adopt those rules through the amendment of the Directive. 
 
Emboldened by the release of the Panama Papers in April 2016 and the global reverberations 
therefrom, the Commission furthermore proposed legislation requiring public country-by-
country reporting.122 This initiative took the form of a proposal to amend the Accounting 
Directive requiring disclosure of financial accounts (2013/34/EU).123 It was accompanied by a 
long impact assessment on public tax transparency rules for multinationals formally 
underpinning the Commission’s proposal.124  
 
Pursuant to this proposal, MNEs (EU/non-EU) with a consolidated turnover of EUR 750 
million would be required to publish annually a report disclosing the profit and the tax accrued 
and paid in each Member State on a country-by-country basis for EU Member States, and in 
the aggregate for all non-EU countries. There is also a requirement that filing entities provide 
a written explanation of any material discrepancies between income tax paid and income tax 
accrued and the addition of accumulated earnings to the list of required quantitative data. This 
information, which is less detailed than under the currently approved country-by-country 
reporting,125 would be made available in a stand-alone report accessible to the public for at 
least 5 years on the company’s website. Companies would also have to file the report with a 
business register in the EU.  
 
There is also a requirement for disaggregated data to be published regarding non-EU Member 
States that do “not respect international tax good governance standards”.126 The Commission 
has added this country-specific reporting requirement for tax haven jurisdictions in its final 
proposed directive on public country-by-country reporting, following the political uproar 
                                                          
121 The information to be reported within this document is similar to that described in Action 13 of the BEPS 
Action Plan. MNE groups should provide annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the 
amount of revenue, profit before income tax, and income tax paid and accrued. MNE groups should also report 
the number of their employees, stated capital, accumulated earnings and tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction. 
Finally, they also should identify each entity within the group doing business in a particular tax jurisdiction and 
provide an indication of the business activities in which each entity is engaged. The information above should be 
reported on an aggregated basis for all entities resident in a specific jurisdiction and not entity-by-entity. 
Under the amended directive, the obligation of preparing a Country-by-Country report will apply to very large 
MNE groups for which the total consolidated group revenue exceeds €750 million (or an amount in local currency 
approximately equivalent to €750 million). The obligation of preparing a Country-by-Country report will apply 
for the fiscal year commencing on or after 1 January 2016 (subject to exceptions). 
Country-by-Country reporting concerns both MNE groups headquartered in an EU Member State and those 
headquartered outside the EU. If the parent entity is headquartered outside the EU, one of the subsidiaries or 
branches established within the EU and appointed by the parent entity will be in charge of the Country-by-Country 
report on behalf of the parent.  
122 See Taxation paper No 61: Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators. Final report. 
123 See Proposed amendment to Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU) regarding disclosure of income tax 
information (COM(2016) 198/2). Transparency requirements already exist for banks under Capital Requirement 
Directive (CRD IV) and for large extractive and logging industries under the Accounting Directive in the form of 
country-by-country reporting. Also see Part II.C. 
124 See Taxation paper No 61: Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators. Final report. 
125 Unlike the Country-by-Country reporting template included in the OECD's action 13 report, the proposal would 
not require reporting of stated capital or tangible assets or segmentation of related- and unrelated-party revenues. 
126 See European Commission, Factsheet, Introducing public country-by-country reporting for multinational 
enterprises - Questions & Answers, Strasbourg, 12 April 2016. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-1351_en.htm  
  
caused by the Panama Papers revelations. This requirement was one way of “help[ing the 
Commission] advance the tax governance agenda internationally”.127 
 
Under this proposal, the Commission would determine which countries to include on the list 
of tax jurisdictions subject to the country-specific reporting requirements based on 
transparency and information exchange, fair tax competition, adherence to G20 and OECD 
standards, and other relevant standards. The proposal allows an exception for entities in 
designated jurisdictions that do not transact with affiliated EU enterprises.  
 
As the proposal for public country-by-country reporting is made in the context of the 
Accounting Directive, it requires qualified majority only.128 Furthermore, penalties for 
noncompliance would be determined based on the penalty provisions adopted by Member 
States under the Accounting Directive. The latest negotiation documents suggest that the EU 
Council and the European Parliament are set to water down this proposal.129 Nevertheless, the 
fact that this proposal is even debated at the level of the EU institutions when it was fervently 
rejected during the discussions on the BEPS project130 shows the level of activism that has been 
generated following this project. It also shows how the Commission has used BEPS initiatives 
and post-BEPS soft law in a way that helps advance its tax governance agenda internationally. 
In fact, the Commission has managed to turn much of this soft law into hard law, not just in 
the area of exchange of information but also in other areas, as shown below.  
 
 
(B) Transparency and the link with money laundering – The European 
Parliament’s initiatives 
 
 
As a follow-up to the External Strategy Communication, in a press release published on 5 July, 
2016,131 the Commission unveiled its latest proposals to tackle terrorism financing and money 
laundering, as well as the next steps to increase tax transparency and tackle tax abuse. The new 
proposals included two legislative proposals to amend the Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
(2015/849/EU) and, once more, the Mutual Assistance Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation in the field of direct taxation (2011/16/EU). As explained in the accompanying 
Communication,132 the proposed measures were, inter alia, aimed at protecting tax good 
governance globally. 
 
The Commission proposed that tax authorities have access to national anti-money laundering 
information, in particular as regards beneficial ownership and due diligence information.133 
                                                          
127 Ibid. 
128 The amendments, which were proposed by DG FISMA (Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial 
Services and Capital Markets Union) required qualified majority under Art 50 TFEU. 
129 Elodie Lamer EU Set to Water Down Public CbC Reporting Proposal, 86 Tax Notes International 565 (May 
15, 2017) 
130 See HJI Panayi (2015), chapter 4, part 4.3. 
131 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2354_en.htm  
132 Communication on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and 
avoidance, COM(2016) 451 final. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/fairer_corporate_taxation/com
_2016_451_en.pdf  
133 This was to be attained through an amendment to the Mutual Assistance Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation in the field of direct taxation (2011/16). 
  
The Commission also proposed that both existing and new accounts be subject to due diligence 
controls and that passive companies and trusts be subject to higher scrutiny and tighter rules.134  
 
In order to improve information exchange on beneficial ownership, the Commission also 
announced that it was examining the most appropriate framework through which Member 
States could automatically exchange national information on beneficial owners of companies 
and trusts. This initiative follows an earlier proposal135  to revise the fourth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive to include a specific reference to tax crimes, as well as to require Member 
States to store beneficial ownership information in central registers which would be accessible 
to the public. On 20 April, 2015 the Council had approved some revisions to this directive, 
including the requirement for all Member States to create central registers of beneficial 
ownership information for companies, other legal entities, and trusts incorporated in their 
respective territories.136 It was, however, up to the discretion of Member States to decide 
whether to make their beneficial ownership registers public.137 Interestingly, The European 
Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs and Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs 
committees on February 28 2017 adopted by a wide majority draft (non-legally binding) plans 
that would require beneficial ownership registers to be made fully public, setting up a potential 
clash with the governments of EU Member States. 
 
On 6 July 2016, the European Parliament voted in plenary session on the report prepared by 
the Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect 
(TAXE2). The report, which was adopted by 514 votes to 68, with 125 abstentions, contained 
recommendations to make corporate taxation fairer and clearer and to tackle tax evasion and 
aggressive tax planning.138 Some of the recommendations were an EU register of beneficial 
owners of companies; a tax havens blacklist; sanctions against non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions; action against abuse of ‘patent box’ regimes; a code of conduct for banks and tax 
advisors; tax good governance rules in EU trade agreements; and a withholding tax on profits 
leaving the EU. 
 
The Special Committee also urged the Commission to present a proposal on the CCCTB before 
the end of 2016, and to present concrete legislation on transfer pricing issues and clarifying 
guidelines as regards their interaction with State aid. The European Parliament had already 
                                                          
134 This was to be attained through amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (2015/849) which would 
be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union as co-legislators. 
135 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. See release on 12 January, 2015, 
available on: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5116-2015-ADD-2/en/pdf 
136 Member States had to ensure that the registers are available to competent authorities, financial intelligence 
units, and ‘obliged entities’, such as banks conducting due diligence tasks. A person had to show a legitimate 
interest in alleged money laundering, terrorist financing, and predicate offenses such as tax crimes to be able to 
access the beneficial ownership details. For trusts, central beneficial ownership information registers would be 
used when the trust generated tax consequences. See Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the 
adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, Brussels, 8 April 2015 (OR. en). Also see regulation, 
available on: 2015 WTD 76-20.  
137 For commentary, see Stephanie Soong Johnston, “EU Council Approves Beneficial Ownership Register 
Rules”, 2015 WTD 76-1 (21 April, 2015) 
138 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar 
in nature or effect (2016/2038(INI)), available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-
0310+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  
  
voted the previous month, on 8 June 2016, for the creation of a Panama Papers committee of 
inquiry “to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of 
Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion”.139 
 
The TAXE report and the European Parliament’s resolutions are indicative of the increasing 
pressure that the European Parliament is putting on other EU institutions with respect to 
countering aggressive tax planning and promoting tax transparency. Indeed, on 6 December 
2016, the Council adopted a directive granting access to tax authorities to information held by 
authorities responsible for the prevention of money laundering.140 The Directive requires 
Member States to provide access to information on the beneficial ownership of companies. 
Member states will have until 31 December 2017 to transpose the directive into national laws 
and regulations. 
 
The European Parliament has also been pushing hard to ensure the European Investment Bank 
does not use public money in tax havens. It has been reported that in 2016, the European 
Commission vetoed projects worth up to €1 billion because it considered the financing 
arrangements linked to those projects to be dubious.141 The European Parliament has proposed 
a provision aimed at ensuring that the European Investment Bank would not maintain business 
relations with entities incorporated or established in non-cooperative jurisdictions. This was 
rejected in Council and the Commission presented a compromise in that the European 
Investment Bank should not maintain business relations with entities established in 
jurisdictions mentioned in the EU blacklist or that do not cooperate with the EU, except where 
the project to be financed is located in the same jurisdiction.  
 
Furthermore, in the wake of the ‘Panama Papers’ leaks, the European Parliament decided to 
establish a Committee of inquiry (the PANA committee) to investigate alleged contraventions 
and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. In the context of this, an ex post impact assessment was published 
in March 2017 regarding the role, powers, and activities of financial intelligence units in 
combating financial crimes such as tax evasion.142 
 
Overall, although the European Parliament’s resolutions and recommendations are not legally 
binding in this area of law, they certainly buttress the efforts of the Commission to adopt 
binding rules.  
 
 
(C)  The EU Listing Process 
 
                                                          
139 See European Parliament Directorate General For Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, The Mandate of the Panama Inquiry Committee – An Assessment, (November 2016), p.10. The 
author of this report (Professor Robby Houben) concluded that the focus of the Committee of inquiry should 
probably lie on the alleged failure of the Commission to enforce and of Member States to implement and to enforce 
effectively the third anti money laundering directive, the 2011 directive on administrative cooperation in the field 
of taxation and the 2006 directive on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts. Ibid, p.29. 
140 See Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards access to anti-money-laundering 
information by tax authorities, available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13885-2016-
INIT/en/pdf  
141 See Elodie Lamer, EU Pushing European Investment Bank to Avoid Tax Havens, Tax Analysts Doc 2017-
54356 
142 http://pdfs.taxnotes.com/2017/2017-55169_PDFOnly_WTDDocs_EU_study_FIUs.pdf . The study was 
undertaken by the DG EPRS Ex-post Assessment Unit (IMPT). 
  
 
The EU Listing Process, first announced in the External Strategy Communication,143 is 
becoming a very important tool in the Commission’s efforts to ‘export’ its tax good governance 
standards. 
 
On 14 September 2016, the Commission completed the first step of this listing process: a 
Scoreboard of all third countries and jurisdictions for tax purposes according to key indicators, 
including economic data, financial activity, institutional and legal structures and basic tax good 
governance standards. The Commission emphasised that the scoreboard did not represent any 
judgement of third countries, nor was it a preliminary EU list.144 It was merely “an objective 
and robust data source, produced by the Commission, to help Member States in the next steps 
of the common EU listing”.145 As a second step, Member States in the Code of Conduct Group 
would choose which third countries should be screened more fully so as to determine the non-
cooperative jurisdictions. In the final step, as stipulated in the External Strategy 
Communication, Member States would decide whether to add the jurisdiction in question to a 
common EU list of problematic tax jurisdictions. This decision would be based mainly on the 
screening process. 
 
In the External Strategy Communication, it was stated that listing a jurisdiction would be a last 
resort option to incentivise transparency and fair taxation. Once a jurisdiction was added to the 
EU list, all Member States would apply common counter-measures against it. There was no 
mention of common measures or sanctions in the September 2016 document setting out the 
scoreboard approach. 
 
In the Scoreboard published in September 2016, the results of a thorough pre-analysis were 
presented, under which third country jurisdictions were examined to determine their risk of 
facilitating tax avoidance. This pre-assessment was firstly based on a wide range of neutral and 
objective indicators; namely, strength of economic ties to the EU,146 financial activity147 and 
stability factors.148 For each indicator, the jurisdiction with the highest value received '1', the 
second-highest received '2', and so forth. 
 
The jurisdictions that featured strongly in these three categories (Table I) and the five 
jurisdictions with transparency agreements with the EU (Table II) were then set against risk 
indicators, such as their level of transparency and exchange of information149 or the potential 
use of preferential tax regimes.150 Another risk factor was the existence of a tax system with 
no corporate income tax or a zero corporate tax rate. These three risk indicators reflected the 
situation in July 2016. The risk indicators did not pre-empt the in-depth analysis of each 
                                                          
143 See Part IV.C. 
144 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/2016-09-15_scoreboard-
indicators.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-20,842  
145 Ibid. 
146 In order to see how strong the economic ties are between the third country and the EU, indicators such as trade 
data, affiliates controlled by EU residents and bilateral FDI flows were examined. 
147 In order to determine if a jurisdiction had a disproportionately high level of financial services exports, or a 
disconnection between their financial activity and the real economy, indicators such as total FDI, specific financial 
income flows and statistics on foreign affiliates were used. 
148 In order to see if the jurisdiction would be considered by tax avoiders as a safe place to place their money, 
general governance indicators such as corruption and regulatory quality were examined. 
149 Here, what was examined was the jurisdictions' status with regard to the international transparency standards 
i.e. exchange of information on request and automatic exchange of information. 
150 Here, what was examined was the existence of potential preferential regimes, identified by the Commission on 
the basis of publicly available information (IBDF, national websites etc.). 
  
jurisdiction’s tax system, which would take place in the screening stage. It was only intended 
to provide Member States with as much information as is possible to decide on the jurisdictions 
that they would want to screen. 
 
In November 2016, the Council published conclusions on the criteria and process for screening 
jurisdictions with a view to establish an EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax 
purposes.151 Whilst several third country jurisdictions are being screened, Member States are 
considering what deterrent measures to introduce. There is no agreement yet on a uniform 
design. It has been reported that the Maltese presidency suggested three different approaches 
to adopting countermeasures: a flexible one, a rigid one, and a “toolbox plus” approach.152 
Under the flexible approach, Member States would be required to indicate which 
countermeasures they will apply, and to which jurisdictions. Member States would be required 
to apply the same countermeasures to all blacklisted jurisdictions. Finally, under the toolbox 
plus approach, countermeasures would be targeted and Member States would still be given 
flexibility in their implementation. 
A final EU tax haven blacklist and its countermeasures are expected to be adopted by the end 
of 2017 – another example of the hardening of soft law. 
 
(D) The Corporate Tax Reform Package  
 
 
Following on its commitments from the 2015 Action Plan, on 25 October 2016, the 
Commission proposed a comprehensive tax package which consisted of four new draft EU 
Directives on the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB Directive) and the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB Directive), a Directive on Hybrid mismatches with 
third countries and a Directive on Double taxation dispute resolution mechanisms in the EU.  
 
As already mentioned,153 in its 2015 summer Action Plan, the Commission had announced that 
it would relaunch the CCCTB project in 2016. This would be done through a two-step 
approach: Member States would first agree on rules for a Common Corporate Tax Base 
(CCTB), after which agreement would be reached on the consolidation element. Neither the 
original proposal published in 2011,154 nor the current proposals involved changes to Member 
States’ corporate tax rates. Indeed, the proposals published in October 2016 consisted of two 
separate draft Directives, one for a CCTB155 and the other for a CCCTB.156 If approved, the 
CCTB proposal would apply from 2019 and the CCCTB proposal from 2021. The difference 
between the CCTB and the CCCTB is the cross-border consolidation of profits and losses, as 
well as the elimination of intra-group transactions. 
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152 See Elodie Lamer, “EU Considering Tax Anti-Tax Haven Rules”, Tax Analysts, Doc 2017-55585 (25 May 
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154 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(201), 121/4 
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156 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016)683 final. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_683_en.pdf  
  
 
What is noteworthy – and to an extent expected – was that under the new proposals the focus 
of attention has shifted from the objective of facilitating corporate groupings and simplifying 
compliance, to countering tax avoidance. The draft Directives contain provisions that are 
similar to those already adopted under the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive adopted in the 
summer of 2016 (ATAD I).157 However, in order to ensure a more harmonised implementation, 
the new proposals give Member States less flexibility to apply stricter rules than required by 
ATAD I. 
 
Along with the CCTB and CCCTB proposals, as expected from earlier announcements, the 
Commission proposed a Directive to broaden the scope of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
as regards hybrid mismatch arrangements (ATAD II),158 so as to align it with the corresponding 
provisions of the CCTB proposal. Under the proposed Directive, the hybrid provisions would 
not only apply to mismatch arrangements within the EU, but also to mismatches arising in 
relation to third countries.159 At the ECOFIN meeting on 6 December 2016, Member States 
failed to reach an agreement on this proposal but undertook to continue the discussion. On 
21 February 2017, the EU 28 Finance Ministers in the ECOFIN Council meeting reached 
agreement on a general approach to amending this Directive. On 29 May 2017, the Council 
formally adopted the Commission’s proposal for ATAD II160 without further discussion. 
Member States have until 31 December 2019, to adopt and publish the laws, regulations, and 
administrative provisions necessary to implement ATAD2, and must apply those provisions as 
of 1 January 2020, with the exception of rules on reverse hybrid mismatches, which must be 
transposed into domestic law by 31 December 2021.161 Therefore, at least in the area of hybrids 
mismatch arrangements, EU Member States have uniform (hard law) rules vis-à-vis third 
countries. 
 
The Commission also delivered on earlier plans to improve the existing dispute resolution 
mechanism for the elimination of double taxation. The Commission argued that the proposed 
Directive would have a wider scope than the Arbitration Convention,162 would be more 
effective, would work quicker and be less costly. The proposed Directive provides for the 
elimination of double taxation by agreement between the Member States including, if 
necessary, by reference to the opinion of an independent advisory body. It focuses on business 
and companies. The proposed Directive builds on the existing Arbitration Convention but 
                                                          
157 See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 1 July 
2016. See OJ 2016 L193/1. The revised directive lays down anti-tax-avoidance rules for situations that may arise 
in five specific fields, after deleting the switch-over clause. Member States now have until 31 December 2018 to 
transpose the Directive into their national laws and regulations, except for the exit taxation rules, for which they 
will have until 31 December 2019. Member States that have targeted rules that are equally effective to the interest 
limitation rules may apply them until the OECD reaches agreement on a minimum standard, or until 1 January 
2024 at the latest. 
158 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third 
countries, COM(2016)687 final. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_687_en.pdf  
159 The hybrid provisions would also deal with mismatches involving PEs, imported mismatches, hybrid transfers 
and dual resident mismatches. 
160 I.e. Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries (ATAD II) 
161 In line with the compromise agreement, the adopted ATAD2 directive includes a carve-out option through to 
31 December 2022, for hybrid regulatory capital in the banking sector, and a carve-out for financial traders 
involving hybrid transfers made in the ordinary course of business. 
162 Convention 90/436/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the 
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises 
  
broadens the scope to areas which are not currently covered, by applying to all instances of 
double taxation of income from business. It also adds targeted features to address the main 
shortcomings of the Arbitration Convention, such as enhancing enforceability and the 
effectiveness of this mechanism. 
 
The proposed Directive provides for mandatory resolution of double taxation disputes, if 
necessary by way of arbitration within strict and enforceable timelines. It sets out when access 
to national courts should be granted for clarifying whether there is an obligation to eliminate 
double taxation and, if so, empowers national courts to take action. Furthermore, the proposed 
Directive allows Member States to choose the methods for solving their double taxation 
disputes provided that double taxation is eliminated within the timelines laid down in the 
Directive. In addition, the proposed Directive allows the Commission to assist Member States 
in the proceedings and increases transparency by requiring at least abstracts of the decisions to 
be published.163 
 
As a final sign of the Commission’s commitment to tax good governance, in November 2016, 
a public consultation was launched to gather feedback on how to deal with advisers and 
intermediaries who facilitate potentially aggressive tax planning schemes and the disincentives 
that can be imposed. This was a response to the European Parliament’s call to develop an EU 
Code of Conduct for all advisory firms to regulate the provision of tax advice,164 especially 
following the release of the Panama Papers which highlighted how certain intermediaries 
actively helped their clients to conceal money offshore.  
 
The Commission’s public consultation sought to gather views on whether there is a need for 
EU action aimed at introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries or taxpayers 
engaged in operations that facilitate tax evasion and tax avoidance and in case there is, how it 
should be designed.165 Rather unsatisfactory, the Commission seems to lump together 
aggressive tax planning and tax evasion and avoidance.166  
 
As a follow-up to these initiatives, on 21 June 2017, the Commission proposed another 
amendment to the Mutual Assistance Directive (2011/16/EU) as regards mandatory automatic 
exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border 
arrangements. The proposal introduces a requirement for intermediaries to disclose potentially 
aggressive tax planning arrangements to their tax authorities.167 The tax authorities will 
subsequently exchange this information automatically with other tax authorities. The proposal 
does not dictate penalties, but defers to the discretion of Member States to implement effective, 
                                                          
163 For commentary, see Sriram Govind and Laura Turcan, “The Changing Contours of Dispute Resolution in the 
International Tax World: Comparing the OECD Multilateral Instrument and the Proposed EU Arbitration 
Directive”, 71 (2017) Bulletin for International Taxation, No. 3/4 
164 See para 23, in the Draft Report on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (2016/2038(INI)) 
of the Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (TAXE2), 2016/2038 
(INI), dated 11 May 2016. The Special Committee called “on the Commission to come forward with a Union 
Code of Conduct for all advisory services, including a Union incompatibility regime for tax advisers, in order to 
prevent them from advising both public and private sectors and to prevent other conflicts of interest”.  
165 These intermediaries included among others consultants, lawyers, financial (investment) advisors, accountants, 
solicitors, financial institutions, insurance intermediaries, and company-formation agents. 
166 See the title of the consultation and the objectives of it. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/consultations-get-involved/tax-consultations/consultation-disincentives-
advisors-and-intermediaries-potentially-aggressive-tax-planning-schemes_en  
167 The proposal does not contain a definition of the terms “arrangement” or “aggressive tax planning”. However, 
an annex to the proposal lists a number of “hallmarks” that present a strong indication of tax avoidance or abuse. 
A cross-border arrangement becomes reportable if it meets one or more of the hallmarks.  
  
proportionate, and dissuasive penalties. The aim of this proposal is to enhance transparency, 
reduce uncertainty over beneficial ownership and dissuade intermediaries from designing, 
marketing and implementing harmful tax structures. 
 
This is another example of an area where the EU is moving forward with hard law, going very 
much above the OECD/G20 BEPS recommendations on minimum standards. 
 
 
(V) CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this paper, the author examined the various facets of good tax governance, in an attempt to 
delineate the actual scope of this concept. A review of the latest initiatives at the level of the 
OECD and UN showed that this concept was closely interlinked with notions of domestic 
resource mobilisation, capacity building, transparency and exchange of information, and, to an 
extent, the implementation of the four minimum standards derived from the BEPS project. The 
international tax community seems to have given a lot of emphasis on the above state functions, 
as shown in Part II.A. There was emphasis on more resources for capacity building and 
domestic resource mobilisation/taxation as well as more ownership and commitment for the 
establishment of transparent, fair and efficient tax systems. 
 
These initiatives are very much in the realm of soft law. However, it is shown that in addition 
to these soft law initiatives, there is a growing number of soft law initiatives which have 
hardened over time. The standards emerging from these initiatives are linked with 
transparency: exchange of information, automatic exchange of information, country-by-
country reporting etc. The distinguishing factor of the soft law initiatives described in Part III 
is their reliance on multilateralism and peer pressure by other countries which has enabled them 
to be morphed into hard law gradually.  
 
Whilst measures proposed to enforce and/or monitor transparency are gradually becoming 
global standards and norms, the European Union is using hard law ab initio, at least as far as 
internal measures (i.e. intra-EU) are concerned. Aided by the political momentum generated 
by the OECD/G20 BEPS project, the EU has effectively moved to harmonize BEPS 
compliance and implementation among Member States. As noted by Christians and Shay, the 
general reporters to the 2017 IFA Congress, Member States “see these EU actions as bedrocks 
to their future BEPS compliance” [and] “responding to mandatory EU measures is expected to 
be a primary method through which EU Member States operationalize their BEPS 
compliance”.168  
 
It would seem that measures implementing the BEPS minimum standards are not just perceived 
as the follow-up to the BEPS project, but essentially, a means of further internal harmonisation. 
However, these measures are very much ad hoc and deal with the exceptions to a tax system – 
i.e. the provisions trying to prevent abuse of that system. Recognising the peculiarity of having 
harmonised anti-abuse rules in a largely unharmonised system and seizing on the political 
momentum of the post-BEPS era, the Commission has recently re-proposed the 
CCTB/CCCTB. This was partially rebranded as an instrument to combat tax 
avoidance/evasion. In reality, this is very much a harmonising proposal – rock solid hard law.  
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It is also obvious from the developments described in Part IV that the Commission has used 
BEPS initiatives and post-BEPS soft law in a way that helps advance its tax governance agenda 
not just within the EU but also internationally. In fact, from the 2012 Recommendation on 
Good Governance, to the External Strategy Communication, to the EU listing process, we are 
increasingly seeing efforts by the EU to export its tax good governance policies. Indicatively, 
the EU’s standards of good tax governance include not just transparency and exchange of 
information, but also the concept of fair tax competition. The latter, is a very vague concept 
which lends itself to some manipulation as regards inclusion of preferred policies.  As fair tax 
competition is likely to be inextricably linked with harmful tax competition – another vague 
concept used in the past169 to address similar concerns – the objectivity of a tax good 
governance clause is likely to be debatable.170 
 
Nevertheless, by linking the EU standards of good tax governance with the polemic against 
aggressive tax planning and in a very timely manner, the EU has managed to overcome the 
reluctance of some of its most recalcitrant (vis-à-vis harmonization) Member States. The author 
had argued elsewhere, that “[o]utside of the EU, instilling and institutionalizing principles of 
good tax governance may not be an easy task as such principles are likely to be seen as 
interfering with a state’s sovereignty in a much more politically sensitive way than any 
suggested anti-abuse measures targeted against what appears to be stateless income”.171 
However, it has been shown in the last two years that if these principles are rebranded in a 
certain way, they amass support – or at least they stave off the opposition. In other words, tax 
good governance and BEPS seem to be a very good excuse for further integration. 
 
It should be noted that most of the recommendations in the area of good tax governance 
especially as regards third countries, are in the realm of soft law as there is no competence to 
harmonise the EU’s external fiscal policy - hence why there are no hard law proposals. 
However, one could say that there is an element of coercion towards third countries to adopt 
the EU’s agenda in this area. The demand for the insertion of the good tax governance clauses 
in bilateral and regional agreements between the EU and some trading partners, combined with 
the possibility of countermeasures and sanctions in the context of the EU listing process are 
two good examples of this. Arguably, such proactive policies risk exacerbating conflicts (trade 
and tax ones) and may be ineffective without inside knowledge that drives decision-making 
and the structure of the system in the other jurisdiction. 
 
The author believes that the Commission and to an extent the European Parliament are likely 
to continue working very hard to promote the “Europeanisation” of tax good governance 
standards, not just because it is the natural thing to do, but for existential reasons. In the post-
Brexit era, the EU desperately needs to present a united front, in as many areas as is possible. 
Fiscal policy is one of them. The problem with this approach is that the concept of tax good 
                                                          
169 See, for example, OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, 1998) and the 
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governance may end up not having a uniform meaning amongst the major international players. 
And herein lies the paradox resulting from the globalisation of good tax governance: powerful 
countries and/or economic blocks are likely to give a domestic flavour to the constituent 
elements of this concept, thus leading to more uncertainties, variable standard setting and 
(erosive) tax competition. This is likely to frustrate existing synergies and detrimentally affect 
developing countries that were initially viewed as the primary beneficiaries for the global 
development of good tax governance standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
